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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A popular government, without popular information, or the means of 
acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both.  
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: and a people who mean to be 
their own governours [sic], must arm themselves with the power which 
knowledge gives.1  
                                                                
1Letter from James Madison to William T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in MADISON:  WRITINGS, 
at 790.  (Jack N. Rakove, ed., 1999). 
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“The essence of Government is power; and power, lodged as it must be in human 
hands, will ever be liable to abuse.”2 
The tension between the competing interests of the government’s need to keep 
secrets in the interest of national security and the interests of free speech and a free 
press existed since the beginning of the republic.  It is generally recognized that 
certain aspects of the business of government must be performed in secrecy, 
particularly in the context of national security and foreign affairs.3  In certain 
scenarios, the Court acknowledged the necessity to restrain the freedom of speech 
and the press in the interests of national security and defense.4 
Because the very essence of our constitutional government is based upon the 
proposition of an informed electorate, it is imperative that the government give great 
deference not only to an individual’s right to freely criticize and debate public 
policy, but also to the press’ right to freely publish, in order to provide the public 
with the information necessary for that debate.5  In addition, openness in government 
is critical because there have been situations where the government’s insistence on 
secrecy served to reduce its credibility among its citizens, and many complain that 
the executive branch, acting in its own self-interest, often abuses the classification 
system.6  As Justice Douglas once stated: 
As has been revealed by such exposes as the Pentagon Papers, the My Lai 
massacres, the Gulf of Tonkin ‘incident’ and the Bay of Pigs invasion, the 
government usually suppresses damaging news but highlights favorable 
                                                                
2James Madison, Speech before the Virginia State Constitutional Convention (Dec. 1, 
1829), in MADISON:  WRITINGS, at 824.  (Jack N. Rakove, ed., 1999). 
3See U.S. Const. art. II § 2, cl. 1-2. (granting the President the power as Commander-in-
Chief of the military and the power to make treaties); THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (John Jay) 
(recognizing the President’s authority to make treaties carries a concomitant power to conduct 
such negotiations in secret); Bruce E. Fein, Symposium, Access to Classified Information:  
Constitutional and Statutory Dimensions, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805 (1985) (stating the 
generally-held proposition that government secrecy is not only essential in the areas of 
military weapons, troops and tactics, but also in the area of foreign relations, treaties and 
executive agreements.  Furthermore, Fein contends that secrecy in government is not 
incompatible with constitutional values, as evidenced by the fact that much of the deliberation 
over the passage of the Constitution was conducted in secret). 
4See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).  Justice Holmes’ famous opinion, 
which stated, “The question in every case is whether the words are used in such circumstances 
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the 
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.  It is a question of proximity and 
degree.”  Id. at 52.  Holmes’ opinion also indicated that while restraints on speech are 
generally not allowed, they operate on a sliding scale, with the restrictions being most severe 
in times of war, when the survival of the nation itself is at stake.)  Id.  See also, Near v. 
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931)  (stating “No one would question but that a government 
might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of sailing dates of 
transports or the number or location of troops”). 
5See, e.g., David H. Topol,  Note, United States v. Morison:  A Threat to the First 
Amendment Right to Publish National Security Information, 43 S. C. L. REV. 581 (1988). 
6See, e.g., Benjamin S. Du Val, Jr., The Occasions of Secrecy, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 579 
(1986). 
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news.  In this filtering process the secrecy stamp is the official’s tool of 
suppression which in ‘99 ½’ of the cases would present no danger to 
national security.7  
In recent years, there have been complaints from a variety of sources that 
national security is continually compromised by a succession of leaks of classified 
information by government employees to the press.8  George Tenet, Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency (hereinafter “CIA”), complained publicly that “the 
executive branch leaks like a sieve”9 and that the harm caused by these leaks “abuses 
the security of Americans.”10  The most compelling reasons set forth for preventing 
leaks are that leaks provide valuable intelligence information to America’s 
adversaries; they compromise the government’s ability to further its legitimate 
policies by allowing for “vetoes by leak;” they endanger intelligence sources and 
methods and potentially endanger the lives of agents; they make other countries less 
willing to cooperate with the United States, because they believe they cannot rely on 
the government’s ability to keep diplomatic or intelligence secrets; and in some 
cases, they allow the government itself to manipulate public opinion by leaking 
partial information when it serves its purposes.11  Max Frankel, former editor of the 
New York Times, best expresses the converse view.  While he acknowledged the 
culture of “leaks” in Washington, which exists as a small network of government 
officials who routinely share classified information with reporters,12 Frankel stated, 
“[w]ithout the use of ‘secrets’ ... there could be no adequate diplomatic, military and 
political reporting of the kind our people take for granted, and there could be no 
mature system of communication between the government and the people.”13 
Thus, the debate rages on between both sides, with varying degrees of force on 
whether the prevalence of “leaks” of classified information through the press to the 
public work to do more harm than good to the government and the nation as a whole.  
Professors Harold Edgar and Benno Schmidt, who were among the first to examine 
the subject, best framed the conundrum faced by those in government when they 
asked, “[h]ow can those who would shape our institutions respond to the threats and 
                                                                
7Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 641-2 (1972) (Douglas, J. dissenting).  
8See generally, Symposium, The First Amendment and National Security, 43 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 61, 64-5 (1988) (comments by Professor Holzer decrying the rampant disclosure of 
classified information to the press for various purposes). 
9Vernon Loeb, Senate Bill Aims to Curb News Leaks;  Revealing Classified Data Would 
Be Felony, WASHINGTON POST, June 14, 2000 at A37. 
10Id. 
11See, e.g., Michael L. Charlson, The Constitutionality of Expanding Prepublication 
Review of Government Employee’s Speech, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 962 (1984); Edward L. Xanders, 
A Handyman’s Guide to Fixing National Security Leaks:  An Analytical Framework for 
Evaluating Proposals to Curb Unauthorized Publication of Classified Information, 5 J.L. POL. 
759 (1989). 
12Theodore F. Kommers, Symposium, Increased Press Access to Government 
Information—Limiting the Range of Government Classification, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 217, 229 (1992). 
13Id. 
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complexity of the modern world, and continue to respect our constitutional traditions 
of separation of powers and of informed freedom of expression on issues critical to 
democratic governance?”14  Another scholar effectively framed the controversial 
nature of the issue as, “[t]he problem of national security leaks is not susceptible to 
easy solution because not all leaks are inherently harmful, and some leaks result in 
the furtherance of democratic ideals ... draconian measures to plug leaks pose a 
serious threat to genuine First Amendment concerns and will always generate fervent 
criticism.”15  
Currently, the House of Representatives introduced H.R. 2943 (hereinafter “The 
Classified Information Protection Act”),16 which would amend section 798 of the 
Espionage Act17 to criminalize the “willful and knowing” disclosure of “properly 
classified” information by any person who is a current or former “officer or 
employee of the United States” or “any other person” with current or former 
authorized access to classified information to “any person who is not authorized 
access to such classified information, knowing that such person is not authorized” 
                                                                
14Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Curtiss-Wright Comes Home:  Executive Power 
and National Security Secrecy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 349, 350 (1986) [hereinafter 
Curtiss-Wright Comes Home]. 
15Xanders, supra note 11, at 760. 
16The Classified Information Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 2943, 107th Cong. (2001) 
[hereinafter The Classified Information Protection Act].  The text of the bill reads as follows: 
Section 798 (A). UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED 
INFORMATION  
(a)  Prohibition – Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States, a 
former or retired officer or employee of the United States, any other person with 
authorized access to classified information, or any other person formerly with 
authorized access to classified information, knowingly and willfully discloses, or 
attempts to disclose, any classified information acquired as a result of such person’s 
authorized access to classified information to a person (other than an officer or 
employee of the United States), who is not authorized access to such classified 
information, knowing that the person is not authorized access to such classified 
information,  shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for not more than 3 years, or 
both. 
(b)  Construction of Prohibition.  Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
establish criminal liability of disclosure of classified information in accordance with 
applicable law to the following: 
   (1)  Any justice or judge of a court of the United States established pursuant to 
article III of the Constitution… 
   (2)  The Senate or House of Representatives, or any committee or 
subcommittee thereof, or joint committee thereof, or any Member of Congress. 
   (3)  A person or persons acting on behalf of a foreign power (including an 
international organization) if the disclosure – 
(A)  is made by an officer or employee of the United States who has been 
authorized to make the disclosure; and  
(B)  is within the scope of such officer’s or employee’s duties. 
   (4)  Any other person authorized to receive classified information. 
17Id.  18 U.S.C.A. §§ 792-799 (West 2001). 
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such access.18  Violation of this proposed law would result in a fine of $10,000, 
imprisonment of up to three years, or both.19 
The purpose of this Note is to discuss the adequacy of existing statutory and 
administrative protections for classified information, examine how the agencies 
responsible for protecting this information implemented controls, and how the courts 
interpreted these existing protections.  This Note argues that the failure of the 
government to prevent “leaks” is not necessarily a failure of the existing scheme, but 
rather a failure of the government to apply current controls.  Furthermore, it 
demonstrates that the Classified Information Protection Act is an unnecessary, 
overbroad, and in some cases, ineffective alternative to the existing protections, with 
a great potential for abuse.  If the bill is passed, it would undoubtedly serve to chill 
important debate on matters of public interest.  Finally, this article will mention some 
possible alternatives to the bill, which could be implemented to protect the 
government’s legitimate need for secrecy while balancing the First Amendment 
rights of government employees and the press. 
II.  LEAKS OF “SECRETS:”  FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERNS 
A.  Pentagon Papers:  The First Attempt to Prevent Publication of Secrets 
In 1971, the two competing interests of government secrecy versus the First 
Amendment reached a flashpoint with the extraordinary case, New York Times v. 
United States (“Pentagon Papers”).20  The dispute arose out of the publication of a 
top-secret study about the United States’ role in Vietnam since the Truman 
Administration, which was leaked to the press by Daniel Ellsberg.21  Ellsberg was a 
defense department analyst who helped author the study, and therefore, had 
authorized possession of the document.22  The document, that Ellsberg was 
authorized to keep in his home, was removed for copying by Anthony Russo.23  The 
study was subsequently published in both the New York Times and the Washington 
Post.24  The document revealed, among other things, that the executive branch 
followed a pattern of deception against the public regarding its intentions to commit 
troops to Vietnam and ultimately served to raise public sentiment against the war 
effort.25 
The case was decided, not with respect to the constitutional issues relating to the 
punishing of Ellsberg and Russo for communicating information relating to 
                                                                
18See The Classified Information Protection Act, supra note 16. 
19Id. 
20403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). 
21Jereen Trudell, Note, The Constitutionality of Section 793 of the Espionage Act and its 




25Microsoft Encarta Encyclopedia, CD-ROM, 2000 edition.  Search Term:  Pentagon 
Papers.   
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government policy-making, but rather on whether the government could enjoin 
reporting news that was obtained through unauthorized transfer of secret 
documents.26  The Court found that prior restraints against publication of 
information, classified or not, even if illegally obtained, are presumptively invalid 
unless the government meets its “heavy burden” of justification for the injunction.27  
The case left open, however, the possibility that the press may be punished 
criminally after classified information is published.28  It also left undecided the 
question of whether the government could constitutionally punish current and former 
government employees who leak classified information to the press.29 
B.  Government Employee as Speaker (or Leaker?):   
First Amendment Considerations 
The calculus changes somewhat when the government attempts to impose 
restrictions on the “ordinary” political speech of government employees.  In 
Pickering v. Board of Education,30 the Court recognized that, a public employee does 
not relinquish First Amendment rights to comment on matters of public concern 
merely by virtue of his employment status.31  The Court also recognized, however, 
that the government as an employer may have different interests than the government 
as sovereign and, therefore “the problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between 
the interests … as a citizen in commenting on matters of public concern and the 
interests of the State as an employer in promoting the efficiency of the public 
services it performs through its employees.”32  In Connick v. Myers,33 the Court held 
that when matters are not of public concern, the government employee’s First 
Amendment rights, while not relinquished, are nonetheless significantly less than in 
their capacities as private citizens.34  As the Court stated, “to presume that all matters 
that transpire within a government office are of public concern would mean that 
virtually every remark – and certainly every criticism directed at a public official – 
would plant the seed of a constitutional case.”35 
                                                                
26Trudell, supra note 21, at 209. 
27The Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 714.  
28Id. at 733.  Justice White stated the “failure by the Government to justify prior restraints 
does not measure its constitutional entitlement to a conviction for criminal publication.”  Id. 
29Trudell, supra note 21, at 209. 
30391 U.S. 563 (1968).  
31Id. 
32Id. at 568.  
33Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).  This case arose out of the firing of an assistant 
district attorney who circulated a questionnaire to other employees after she was informed of a 
transfer to a different section of the court.  The questionnaire involved such matters as office 
transfer policy, employee morale, the possible formation of an employee grievance committee 
and whether or not other employees received pressure within the office to work on political 
campaigns.  Id. 
34Id. 
35Id. at 149. 
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Resolution of the issue of disclosure of classified information by government 
employees should also ultimately return to the central premise of Pickering and its 
progeny.  The Court stated, “whether a [government] employee’s speech addresses a 
matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form and context of a 
given statement, as revealed by the whole record.”36  As such, any proposed changes 
to the laws regarding disclosure of classified information must take into account a 
balancing formula derivative of the Pickering rule between the employee’s interest in 
speaking about matters of public concern and the government’s compelling interest 
in protecting our nation’s security.37  As will be discussed later in this Note, when 
the government speaker discloses classified national security information, even for 
matters clearly in the public concern, the Court’s balancing the interests of the 
government and the employee becomes almost a fiction.  If the Classified 
Information Protection Act of 2001 is enacted, it will, by its very terms, in 
combination with existing judicial decisions on the subject, effectively render moot 
any principled effort to apply Pickering.  This would be a grave error. 
III.  HISTORY OF THE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PROTECTION ACT:   
OLD WHINE, NEW BOTTLE? 
The Classified Information Protection Act was proposed on September 21, 2001 
by Congressman David Vitter, and was immediately referred to the House Judiciary 
Committee.38  The introduction of the bill took place after an identical provision in 
the Senate, sponsored by Richard Shelby, Vice Chairman of the Senate Intelligence 
Committee,39 was withdrawn from consideration as an amendment to the Senate’s 
version of the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2002 on September 5, 2001.40  
Originally, a hearing was scheduled before the Senate Intelligence Committee on the 
same day the proposed amendment was withdrawn.41  The hearing was to discuss the 
measure, and would have included testimony from both the Attorney General and the 
Director of the CIA.42  The hearing was abruptly cancelled, after much opposition 
from members of Congress and interest groups, including the press and civil 
libertarians.43 
                                                                
36Id. at 147-48. 
37Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.  
38H.R. 2943, 107th Cong. (2001).  
39S. 1428, 107th Cong. (2001). 
40See Walter Pincus & Vernon Loeb, White House Still Undecided on Proposal to Limit 
Leaks; Measure would Criminalize disclosure of Classified Data, WASHINGTON POST, August 
23, 2001, at A23.  (describing the proposal and a scheduled hearing on September 5, 2001 on 
the proposed measure). 
41See Walter Pincus, Bid to Crack Down On Leaks is Put Off; White House not Ready to 
Back Plan, WASHINGTON POST, September 5, 2001, at A02; Jim Lobe, Politics U.S.:  Bush 
Backs Off Secrecy Bill, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Sept. 5, 2001 (on file with LEXIS, News 
Library, Wire Service Stories File). 
42See Pincus & Loeb, supra note 40. 
43See Pincus & Loeb, supra note 40. 
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Ironically, an identical provision was tacked onto the Intelligence Authorization 
Act the previous year, that passed through both Houses of Congress with very little 
debate.44  While initially supported by members of the administration, after further 
consideration, President Clinton vetoed it.45 
The proposed anti-leak provision in the 2001 Senate Bill was replaced by a 
section authorizing the creation of an interagency task force, to determine whether 
the new law is needed.46  According to the provision, the Attorney General is to lead 
the review and is to be assisted by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, 
the Departments of Defense and Energy and other agencies that have responsibility 
for handling classified information.47  The amendment to the Act will also require the 
task force to report to Congress by the statutorily mandated deadline of May 1, 2002.  
The Intelligence Authorization Act of 2002 was passed as amended, and the House 
Version of that bill was signed into law on December 28, 2001.48  Because the 
Attorney General is now authorized to conduct an investigation, it is appropriate that 
discussion turns to the existing legal administrative and judicial mechanisms for 
protecting classified information.  In the interim, the Classified Information 
Protection Act that contains identical language to the Senate’s original rider to the 
Intelligence Authorization Act of 2002 stands at the ready should the Commission 
recommend that new legislative protection against leaks is necessary.49 
IV.  FIXING THE LEAKS:  WHAT’S CURRENTLY IN THE STATUTORY TOOLBOX? 
According to a Congressional study, there are five major categories of 
government information protected by government secrecy.50  These include national 
defense information, foreign relations information, information relating to 
government law enforcement investigations, proprietary commercial information 
relating to the maintenance of commercial advantage, and information relating to 
personal privacy.51  The first two categories of information relate to what is 
commonly defined as “national security information” and are the focus of most of 
the current statutory protections.52  They are also the primary focus for analysis here. 
                                                                
44See Pincus & Loeb, supra note 40. 
45Id. 
46See S. 1428, 107th Cong. § 307 (2001). 
47See Jerry Seper, Ashcroft Creates Interagency Task Force on Security Leaks, 
WASHINGTON TIMES, December 16, 2001, at A3. 
48Intelligence Authorization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-108, § 310 Stat. 1394, 1401 
(2001). 
49H.R. 2943, 107th Cong. (2001) 
50Secrecy:  Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy, 
103rd. Cong., Report Pursuant to Public Law 236 (Comm. Print 1997) [hereinafter Moynihan 
Report].  The Report is the result of the second comprehensive study in forty years to look at 
the methods costs and benefits of government secrecy.  It was the result of a bipartisan effort, 
and made several recommendations on how to improve the protection on essential classified 
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Gorin v. United States53 defined “National defense” information.  The Court 
characterized it as a “generic concept of broad connotations, referring to the military 
and naval establishments and the related activities of national preparedness.”54  Since 
Gorin, this concept of national defense information has been consistently applied in 
all cases involving unauthorized disclosure, whether such disclosure was to a foreign 
agent or power or to the press.55  It is also the linchpin in evaluating many of the 
primary statutory protections against leaks of information, and is one of the key 
reasons that individuals favoring the new legislation consider current statutes 
insufficient.56 
The first and arguably most important of the provisions protecting the secrecy of 
national security information is the Espionage Act,57 which proscribes various 
conduct, from “harboring or concealing” persons who one “knows or has reasonable 
grounds to believe or suspect has committed” acts of espionage defined in sections 
793 or 794,58 to various prohibitions against violating regulations promulgated by the 
Administrator of NASA.59 
A.  Section 793 of the Espionage Act 
There are several provisions of the Espionage Act, that arguably have 
implications to the leaking of classified information to the press.  The section of 
primary importance, that is most readily applicable to the leaking of government 
secrets to the press, is section 793.60  This section consists of six major provisions 
covering two different kinds of prohibited activity, both traditional espionage and 
other disclosures of national defense information.  Violating any of these provisions 
is subject to a fine and/or imprisonment for a period of up to 10 years.61  Currently, 
the few major prosecutions against “leakers” of national defense information have 
been tried under this section.  Further examination of the prohibitions embodied in 
the code, as well as how courts interpreted the terms, will demonstrate how courts 
interpreted the statute to apply to leaks of classified information to the press. 
Subsections 793 (a) and (b) are constructed to impose criminal penalties on 
individuals who “for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national 
                                                                
53312 U.S. 19 (1941). 
54Id at 28. 
55See, e.g., United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied 488 U.S. 
908 (1988); Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). 
56See, e.g., Pincus & Loeb, supra note 39.  The authors quote a position paper prepared by 
the Intelligence Committee in 2000 which maintained that current law does not cover “leaked 
intelligence information regarding sources and methods, counter-narcotics, counterintelligence 
capabilities and liaison relationships with foreign intelligence groups because they don’t fall 
within the accepted definition of national defense information.”  Id. 
5718 U.S.C.A. §§ 792-799 (West 2001). 
5818 U.S.C.A. § 792 (West 2001). 
5918 U.S.C.A. § 799 (West 2001).  
6018 U.S.C.A. § 793 (West 2001). 
61Id. 
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defense with intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used to the 
injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation.”62  By their 
structure and language, these subsections are designed to punish cases of espionage 
or, more accurately, the activities in contemplation of espionage activity,63 such as 
the famous case of United States v. Rosenberg,64 where the defendants were 
convicted of conspiring to steal, deliver and transfer nuclear secrets to 
representatives of the Soviet Union.65 
Subsection 793 (a) prohibits an individual from entering upon, flying over, or 
otherwise obtaining information relating to “vessels, aircraft, work of defense, navy 
yard, naval station ... building, office, laboratory, station or other place connected 
with the national defense ... or any prohibited place so designated by the President by 
proclamation in time of war or national emergency, information as to which the 
President has determined would be prejudicial to the national defense” and with the 
“intent that the information would be used to the injury of the United States or to the 
advantage of any foreign nation.”66  Subsection 793(b) applies the same purpose and 
intent standards to the individual who “copies, takes, makes, or obtains, or attempts 
to copy, take make or obtain, any sketch, photograph, photographic negative, 
blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, document, writing, or note of 
anything connected to the national defense.”67  Professors Edgar and Schmidt argue 
convincingly, that focusing on the obtainer’s state of mind as to the eventual use of 
the information, is consistent with Congressional purpose to punish only those who 
have the intent to injure the United States.68  If this particular formula is followed, 
then it is clear that these particular subsections are not applicable to the individual 
who gathers the information and reports it to the press.  The absence of a single case 
under sections 793(a) and (b) involving prosecution of persons who leak information 
related to the national defense to the press, while not conclusive, seems to bear out 
that Edgar and Schmidt’s interpretation is correct. 
Subsection 793(c)69 applies the same purpose standard, that is, to obtain 
information relating to the national defense, to the receipt or acquisition of a broad 
range of materials or information “connected to the national defense, knowing or 
having reason to believe, at the time he receives or obtains, or attempts to receive or 
                                                                
6218 U.S.C.A. §§ 793(a) – (c) (West 2001).  
63See generally, Harold and Benno C. Schmidt, Jr.  The Espionage Statutes and 
Publication of Defense Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929 (1973)  (discussing the legislative 
histories of the Espionage Act of 1917, and it’s predecessor statute, the Defense Secrets Act of 
1911) [Hereinafter The Espionage Statutes]. 
64195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1952). 
65Id.  
6618 U.S.C.A. § 793(a) (West 2001). 
6718 U.S.C.A. § 793(b) (West 2001). 
68See The Espionage Statutes, supra note 63, at 997-98. 
69See 18 U.S.C § 793(c) (the specific materials connected to the national defense, and 
referred to in this section of the statute include “any document, writing, code book, signal 
book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, 
appliance or note”). 
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obtain that it has been or will be obtained ... contrary to the provisions of this 
chapter.”70  A literal reading of the statute appears to do away with the intent 
standard.  In that sense, it would be much like the proposed Classified Information 
Protection Act,71 in that no standard of intent to harm the United States or advantage 
a foreign nation is present. 
Professors Edgar and Schmidt argue that the legislative history of section 793 
demonstrates that Congress intended subsection (c) to be read with the same 
culpability standards as subsections (a) and (b), although they admit that the 
language of the statute does not inform such an interpretation.72  They also argue, 
that even if the statute is read literally, that the scope of the statute is dependent on 
other factors, the most important of which is that it prohibits the receipt of only 
tangible items.73  Furthermore subsection (c) requires that the receipt of such items is 
only criminal if the recipient is aware that they were obtained in violation of 
subsections 793 (a) and (b).74  They also note, if subsections (d) and (e) are construed 
by the courts to include information released for the purpose of public debate, will 
influence the interpretation of subsection (c).  The effect of this construction would 
make the receipt of any tangible document or note a crime, even if there is no 
conspiratorial relationship between the provider of the information and the 
recipient.75  Such a strict constructionist interpretation of the section would implicate 
the First Amendment rights of the press if the reporter was aware that the document 
he received was illegally taken. 
As will be discussed, there is support for such a reading in the limited case law 
relating to the subject.  However, if such a reading is followed, it would, while 
viewed in combination with subsections (a) and (b), have the bizarre effect of 
criminalizing the press for receiving and printing the information in cases such as 
Pentagon Papers,76 while sparing the person who obtained the information from 
criminal punishment, because the requisite intent of harm to the United States or 
advantage to a foreign nation cannot be easily proven.  On the other hand, the 
standard of proof needed to subject the recipient to criminal penalties is arguably 
less, because while the recipient may not have actual knowledge of the violation, 
they may have reason to believe that the statute has been violated if they receive 
pictures, notes or other materials relating to defense installations or instrumentalities. 
Subsections of 793 (d) and (e) may be treated together for the purposes of 
discussion, because while each proscribes a different type of behavior, each is 
similar in that subsection 793 (d) provides that “whoever, lawfully having possession 
of, access to, or control over any document, writing…or note relating to the national 
defense, or information relating to the national defense, which information the 
possessor knows or has reason to believe could be used (emphasis added) to the 
                                                                
70Id. (emphasis added). 
71See H.R. 2943, 107th Cong. (2001). 
72The Espionage Statutes, supra note 63,at 1059. 
73Id. 
74Id. 
75Id. at 1060. 
76403 U.S. at 713. 
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injury of the United States,”77 and subsequently either willfully communicates to 
another person who is also not authorized to possess it or fails to return it to a party 
who is authorized is subject to criminal penalties.78  The language of subsection 793 
(e) is identical, except that the terms of the offense are applied to those who have 
unauthorized possession of the writings or other materials.79  The interesting thing 
about these statutes is that they retain the element of willful communication, but the 
specific intent requirement is markedly absent, much like in the current formulation 
of the proposed statute.80  In addition, because the prohibition on “communication” 
or retention in subsections (d) and (e) is to “any person not entitled to receive it,”81 it 
arguably implicates not only the First Amendment rights of the employee, but also 
those of the press.  Moreover, when subsections (d) and (e) are read broadly, then 
under subsection (c)’s prohibitions, members of the press could arguably be subject 
to criminal liability if they “had reason to believe,” that their source obtained the 
information in violation of subsections (d) and (e). 
Professors Edgar and Schmidt maintain that Congress did not intend for 
disclosure of defense information and subsequent publication to fall under the ambit 
of subsection (d) and (e)’s prohibitions.82  Furthermore, they state “while the 
legislative record is reasonably clear that a broad reading is not intended…(and) is 
almost certainly unconstitutionally vague and overbroad,”83 the language of the 
subsections “does not lend itself to any one confined reading as a means of saving 
them.”84  In the limited case law that exists on prosecution of leaks of classified 
information to the press under sections 793 (d) and (e), one court refused to accept 
the argument and successfully convicted an individual for disclosing classified 
information to the press.85 
The last subsection, 793(f) states that a person authorized to possess various 
kinds of documents or other items relating to the national defense, who through 
“gross negligence” allows these items to be illegally removed, lost or abstracted 
from his possession without notifying his superior officer, is subject to fine or 
imprisonment.86  This provision could also arguably be used to prosecute “leakers” 
like Ellsberg, who allowed the documents in his possession to be copied for 
publication.87 
                                                                
7718 U.S.C.A. § 793(d) (West 2001). 
78Id. 
7918 U.S.C.A. § 793(d) (West 2001). 
80Compare 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 793(d) and (e) (West 2001) with H.R. 2943, 107th Cong. 
(2001). 
8118 U.S.C.A. §§ 793(d) - (e) (West 2001). 
82The Espionage Statutes, supra note 63, at 1000. 
83Id. 
84Id. 
85United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 
(1988).  
8618 U.S.C.A. § 793(f) (West 2001). 
87See Trudell, supra note 21, at 216. 
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B.  Other Espionage Act Provisions and their Relevance to Press Leaks 
Three other sections of the Espionage Act implicate the First Amendment by 
prohibiting “publication” in certain circumstances.  Section 798 prohibits a person 
from “knowingly and willfully” communicating, “publishing” or using “in any 
manner prejudicial to the United States, any classified cryptographic or 
communications information or information relating to any device used for 
cryptographic or communications intelligence” to an unauthorized person.88  In 
analyzing the scope of a particular section of a statute, it should be viewed in relation 
to all of the other sections to determine its meaning.  Professors Edgar and Schmidt 
point out that section 798 is violated merely on the showing of a knowing and willful 
communication, while no intent to harm or disadvantage the United States is 
necessary for conviction.89  Furthermore, the appearance of the term “publishes” 
implies that for this particular class of information, it is meant to operate as a ban on 
public speech.90 
Looking at all of the provisions of section 793, alongside section 798, it would 
appear that section 793 was not meant to cover publication of defense information, 
and therefore, the First Amendment rights of the press to publish other information 
relating to the national defense are not implicated.  Because it is clear that 
communications intelligence information falls under the larger umbrella of national 
defense information,91 breaking that subclass of information out separately in another 
section seems like surplusage if section 793 in fact, covers publication.  Furthermore, 
this one possible reading of sections 793 and 798, appears to indicate, that for, at 
least this one particular class of national defense information, the press could be 
criminally liable, not only for publication of this information, but theoretically for its 
receipt under subsection 793 (c). 
There are two final sections of the Espionage Act, that implicate the First 
Amendment right of government employees and the press by specifically referring to 
publication.  Sections 79592 and 797,93 referred to as the photographic statutes,94 
prohibit the taking and subsequent publication of photographs of military or naval 
installations if they are defined by the President as vital to the national defense and 
therefore protected against the general dissemination of information.  After thirty 
days following such a determination by the President, anyone taking photographs of 
these installations and publishing them, unless specifically authorized by the 
commander of the installation, and subject to censorship by a proper authority, is 
subject to a criminal penalty.95  These statutes therefore authorize prior restraints, in 
the form of pre-publication review, in contrast to the general presumption against it 
                                                                
8818 U.S.C.A. § 798 (West 2001). 
89The Espionage Statutes, supra note 63, at 1000. 
90Id. 
91Id. 
9218 U.S.C.A. § 795 (West 2001). 
9318 U.S.C.A. § 797 (West 2001). 
94The Espionage Statutes, supra note 63, at 1069. 
95Id. 
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in the Pentagon Papers96 case, and also allow for the extraordinary remedy of post-
publication criminal punishment against the press or any other person who publishes 
them.97  According to the legislative history of the statutes, it is unclear whether 
Congress was aware at the time the statutes were passed, that they were also meant 
to authorize prior review of top-secret documents relating to these vital installations.  
In other words, it is unclear whether the top-secret nature of these facilities was 
imputed to any photographic or graphical representation already existing.98  Like 
section 798 and the Classified Information Protection Act,99 no intent to injure the 
United States or to advantage a foreign nation is required to create criminal liability 
under these statutes. 
C.  Other Specialized Statutes Prohibiting Disclosure 
There are a few other specialized statutes, that bear mention because they either 
explicitly restrict disclosures of certain types of information, or they have been 
applied to punish these disclosures.  Some of these statutes are narrowly drawn, and 
reach modes of behavior that Congress did not believe fell under the purview of the 
Espionage Statutes.  Many of them were specifically enacted in response to the 
publication of national security information.100  Others have been construed to enable 
the government to prosecute both a government employee who leaks classified 
information, and to impose prior restraints against not only the government 
employee as a speaker communicating or publishing on his own, but also against the 
press when they serve as the channel through which such communications are made 
to the public. 
Although by no means an exhaustive treatment, the following discussion centers 
on these other important statutes, which were enacted to prohibit specific disclosures 
by government employees, and how they implicate the First Amendment.  As will 
become evident, most of the statutes were ad hoc responses to specific events, which 
                                                                
96Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 713 (1971). 
97See 18 U.S.C.A. § 795 (West 2001); 18 U.S.C.A. § 797 (West 2001). 
98The Espionage Statutes, supra note 63, at 1071. 
99H.R. 2943, 107th Cong. (2001). 
100The Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 421-426 (West 2001) 
[Hereinafter The Intelligence Identities Protection Act].  The Act created a prohibition against 
disclosure of identities of covert agents operating on behalf of the United States to “any 
individual not authorized to receive classified information, knowing that the information 
disclosed so identifies such covert agent and that the United States is taking affirmative 
measures to conceal such covert agent’s intelligence relationship to the United States.” Id.  
The Act in section 421 (a) provides penalties in the form of fines or imprisonment for up to 10 
years, in the case where the individual has authorized access to classified information that 
identifies covert agents.  In section 421 (b), if a person learns the identity of a covert agent 
through classified information which does not necessarily identify a covert agent explicitly, 
and subsequently makes the disclosure to an unauthorized person, they are subject to fine and 
imprisonment up to a period of 5 years.  Section 421 (c) contains a provision criminalizing 
persons with a fine and or imprisonment of up to three years, when they engage in a “pattern 
of activities intended to identify and expose covert agents”.  This penalty applies even if such 
individual does not have access to, nor uses classified information in identifying those agents.  
Id. 
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brought the scope of coverage of the Espionage Act into question.  In light of the 
variety of prohibitions that have been promulgated over the years and the scant 
amount of case law interpreting and enforcing these statutes, it is unsurprising that 
Congress now is proposing a reform as sweeping and potentially chilling as the 
Classified Information Protection Act. 
The first of these statutes is the Intelligence Identities Protection Act,101 which 
arose after the publication of two books, Dirty Work 1: The CIA in Western Europe 
and Dirty Work 2:  The CIA in Africa, by former CIA Agent Philip Agee,102 and the 
magazines “Counterspy” and “Covert Information Bulletin” that purported to 
identify covert agents operating in foreign countries.103  Following publication of the 
names of alleged covert agents in the magazines, two attacks took place.  A month 
after being identified in “Counterspy” as the CIA station chief in Athens, Greece, 
Richard Welch was murdered.104  In a later incident, after the editors of “Covert 
Information Bulletin” identified an embassy official as a CIA operative, an 
unsuccessful attempt was made on his life.105  Because the CIA alleged that even in 
the absence of the attacks, the activities of these publishers and former insiders 
compromised the integrity of intelligence operations abroad, and because Congress 
did not believe that existing statutes were adequate protection, the Intelligence 
Identities Protection Act was enacted.106  
It is clear that keeping the identity of CIA operatives in foreign countries secret 
presents one of the more critical issues relating to national security, particularly 
because it concerns the integrity of the United States’ intelligence sources and 
methods.  As such, this is presumed to be a legitimate aim by most commentators 
and scholars.107  In addition, it is arguable that from the definition of “national 
defense” set forth in Gorin and section 793, that the identities of covert agents do not 
readily fall under the ambit of that definition, unless one broadly reads the phrase 
“related to national preparedness.”108  Because Gorin itself encourages the use of  
“broad connotations,”109 then arguably, the Espionage Statutes apply.  If one adopts 
the narrower interpretation, however, then none of the Espionage Statutes clearly 
apply to this situation.  After careful deliberation, Congress accepting the more 
narrow interpretation, enacted the legislation, which it believed closed a loophole in 
the existing statutory scheme. 
Another statute, that creates criminal penalties for the dissemination of certain 
types information is 18 U.S.C. § 952, governing diplomatic codes and 
                                                                
101Id. 
102Susan D. Charkes, Note, The Constitutionality of the Intelligence Identities Protection 
Act, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 727, 754 n.4 (1983). 
103Id. at 728. 
104Id. at 754, n.7.  
105Id.  
106Id. at 729. 
107See Xanders, supra note 11, at 782-83.  
108Gorin, 312 U.S. at 28. 
109Id. 
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transmissions.110  Section 952 prohibits government employees who “without 
authorization” willfully “publish or furnish to another” diplomatic codes, 
information prepared or transmitted in such codes or “any matter obtained while in 
the process of transmission between any foreign government and its diplomatic 
mission in the United States” and punishes violators with a fine or imprisonment of 
up to 10 years.111  Interestingly, this is one of the few provisions, like section 798, 
where Congress criminalized publication, as opposed to communication, lending 
further credence to the theory that the term “communication,” does not include 
publication.  Another possible, and more benign explanation why this statute 
specifically criminalizes publication may have less to do with the distinction and 
more with the quick and ill-considered legislative response, that often results from 
government embarrassment. 
This statute was, like the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, enacted in 
response to publication of a book entitled The American Black Chamber, published 
by Herbert Yardley, a former director of a State Department division responsible for 
breaking diplomatic codes.112  The book contained not only descriptions of code 
breaking procedures, but also included decoded messages intercepted from the 
Japanese government in 1921.113  The publication of the book not only led to strained 
relations between the two governments, but also led to the adoption of a new code 
system by Japan.114  When the government learned that Yardley was about to publish 
a second book, Congress hurriedly passed section 952 to prevent further damage 
from the potential disclosure of diplomatic codes and messages,115 but not before the 
prohibition was significantly narrowed from its original scope, which included 
individuals who were not employees of the government, due to the potential effects 
on freedom of the press.116 
Congress responded again to the perceived lack of coverage of the Espionage 
Statutes in relation to atomic energy and weapons when it enacted the “Restricted 
Data” statutes in 1954117 to prevent disclosures of information under the control of 
the Atomic Energy Commission (now the Nuclear Regulatory Commission) to 
unauthorized individuals.118  Section 2274 of Title 42 is the key provision, and 
prohibits any person with lawful or unlawful “possession of, access to, control over 
or being entrusted with any document, writing, sketch, photograph, plan, model, 
appliance, note or information involving or incorporating restricted data”119 from 
                                                                
11018 U.S.C.A. § 952 (West 2001).  
111Id. 
112The Espionage Statutes, supra note 63, at 1060-61. 
113Id. at 1061. 
114Id. 
115Id. 
116Id. at 1062.  
11742 U.S.C.A. §§ 2271-2281 (West 2001). 
118See The Espionage Statutes, supra note 63, at 1075. 
11942 U.S.C.A. § 2274 (West 2001). 
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either “communicating transmitting or disclosing”120 or any attempt to do so, to “any 
individual or person ...with the intent to injure the United States or advantage any 
foreign nation.”121  Subsection 2274 (a) follows the form of a prohibition of classic 
espionage behavior, and provides stiff penalties of up to life imprisonment and or a 
fine of up to $100,000.122  Section 2274 (b) carries the same prohibitions as section 
(a), but reduces the culpability standard from intent to reason to believe, and 
provides for a fine of $50,000 and/or imprisonment of not more than ten years.123  
Professors Edgar and Schmidt argue that the split in culpability standards in 
subsection (b) when coupled with the absence of a willful intent to communicate the 
information, as is required in the Espionage Statutes, demonstrate Congress’ intent to 
punish disclosure of nuclear secrets on the mere showing of recklessness or even 
negligence.124  If this is true, it is indicative of the seriousness in which Congress 
viewed potential harm, in relation to other “garden variety” types of national defense 
information.  The question remains, however, as to why Congress did not merely 
amend the Espionage Statues to include a special category of penalty for information 
controlled by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, rather than enact an entirely 
separate statute.  What it indicates, if nothing else, is the complexity of the problem 
of protecting government secrets and the complete lack of coherent standards, which 
inevitably lead to confusion and lack of effective enforcement. 
Section 783 of Title 50 is yet another provision enacted by Congress to guard 
against disclosure of classified information by government employees.  Section 783 
(a) prohibits government officers or employees from communicating “any 
information of a kind which shall have been classified by the President or by the 
head of any department, agency or corporation with the approval of the President as 
affecting the security of the United States”125 to “any person such officer or 
employee knows or has reason to believe to be an agent or representative of any 
foreign government” without specific authorization from the President or other 
specified authority.126  Section 783 (b) makes it criminal for an “agent or 
representative of a foreign government knowingly to obtain or receive or attempt to 
obtain or receive from any officer”127 classified information unless special 
authorization was received from “the head of the department, agency or corporation 
having custody or control over such information.”128  The penalty for violation of 
any provision within the statute is a fine of up to $10,000 and imprisonment of up to 
                                                                
12042 U.S.C.A. § 2274(a) (West 2001).  
121Id. 
122Id. 
12342 U.S.C.A. 2274(b) (West 2001). 
124See The Espionage Statutes, supra note 63, at 1075. 
12550 U.S.C.A. § 783(a) (West 2001). 
126Id. 
12750 U.S.C.A. § 783(b) (West 2001).  
128Id. 
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ten years.129  Like the Restricted Data statutes, the “reason to believe” language 
seems to indicate that recklessness or negligence may suffice to convict. 
Finally, there is one last statute that the government attempted to apply against 
government employees who have leaked classified information.  Section 641 of Title 
18 is a statute designed to punish persons whom embezzle or convert any “record, 
voucher, money or thing of value” for their own use or the use of another.130  The 
punishment under the statute is a fine or imprisonment up to ten years, unless the 
value of the “property” is less than $1,000, in which case the penalty is a fine or 
imprisonment of up to one year.131 
In summary, the perceived problems with the statutes are threefold.  First, due to 
their ad hoc nature and the number of statutes enacted, it is difficult to determine 
which statutes, if any, should apply to government employees who leak information 
to the press.  Second, the statutes provide little guidance in their language for how 
courts should apply them in such situations.  Judges tend to defer to the executive 
branch because there is no clear congressional guidance and judges are concerned 
about fashioning doctrine in areas where they have little expertise.132  Third, this 
coupled with the fact that the government has rarely attempted to prosecute 
employees who leak classified information to the press under these statues, means 
that the statutes have not, in many instances, been tested to see if they are effective 
against those who leak classified information. 
V.  USING WHAT’S IN THE TOOLBOX—PROSECUTIONS OF  
“LEAKERS” UNDER EXISTING LAW 
The applicability of the statutes discussed in the previous section is, for the most 
part, open to speculation, because they have been used on only two occasions to 
pursue prosecution against a government employee who leaked classified 
information to the press.  The first case, involving the prosecutions of Ellsberg and 
Russo for leaking the Pentagon Papers to the Washington Post, was dismissed, 
without a hearing on its merits.133  The second case, United States v. Morison,134 is 
extraordinarily important, because it demonstrates the reasoning one court used to 
                                                                
12950 U.S.C.A. § 783 (West 2001). 
13018 U.S.C.A. § 641 (West 2001). 
131Id. 
132See Eric E. Ballou & Kyle E. McSlarrow, Plugging the Leak:  The Case for a 
Legislative Resolution of the Conflict Between the Demands of Secrecy and the Need for an 
Open Government, 71 VA. L. REV. 801 (1985) (hereinafter Plugging the Leak).  The authors 
set forth two underlying purposes for the court’s deference to the Executive; a concern about 
separation of powers, recognizing that the Executive Branch’s primarily responsibility for 
national defense and foreign policy, as well as what the authors describe as judiciary’s self-
perceived “institutional incompetence”, whereby the courts will not interfere unless there is a 
separate constitutional issue.  Id. at 828-29. 
133Topol, supra note 5, at 588.  Topol notes that after the Government was not granted the 
injunction against the New York Times and the Washington Post, they attempted to pursue 
prosecution against Ellsberg and Russo for their roles in the Pentagon Papers episode, but the 
case was dismissed as the result of “extreme government misconduct.”  Id. 
134Morison, 844 F.2d at 1057. 
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apply existing statutes to exactly the situation the Classified Information Protection 
Act purports to correct, that is, leaks of classified information from a government 
employee to the press.  It also marks the first successful, and as it turns out, only 
prosecution by the government of any person under sections 793 (d) and (e), as well 
as under the section 641 conversion statute for leaking information to anyone who 
was not an agent of a foreign government.135 
Morison was employed at the Naval Intelligence Support Center for ten years 
with a Top Secret Security Clearance.136  In contemplation of receiving this 
clearance, he signed a Non-Disclosure Agreement and was given clear instruction 
into the proper procedures for determining both who was authorized to receive 
disclosure and the consequences for failing to comply with these procedures.137  He 
later, with the approval of the Navy, became engaged as a consultant with Jane’s 
Fighting Ships, a British annual specializing in reporting on current developments in 
international naval operations.138  The Navy approved the arrangement on the 
condition that Morison would not use classified information on the U.S. Navy, or 
“extract unclassified data on any subject and forward it to Jane’s.”139  Morison’s 
arrangement with Jane’s, prior to committing the act for which he was prosecuted, 
was informal, with Jane’s paying him varying amounts for the information 
supplied.140   
The arrangement eventually became a point of contention between Morison and 
his superiors and, as a result, when Morison learned that Jane’s was to begin 
publishing a weekly magazine, he arranged a meeting with Jane’s editor, Derek 
Wood, to discuss the possibility of employment with the new venture.141  At the 
meeting, Wood asked about an explosion at a Soviet naval shipyard, and stated that 
he believed the explosion was very serious.142  Morison indicated that the explosion 
was far more serious than had been reported and offered to provide additional 
material to Wood if he was interested, though no compensation was discussed at the 
time.143  Wood indicated that he would like to see additional information relating to 
the explosion and, pursuant to that end, Morison provided approximately three pages 
of background material about the base where the explosion occurred,144 at least some 
of which was later found to have been extracted from a secret report found in 
Morison’s home.145  Morison also provided Wood information about two other 
                                                                
135Id. 
136Id. at 1060. 
137Id.  
138Id. 
139Morison, 844 F.2d at 1060. 
140Id. 
141Id. at 1060-61. 
142Id. at 1061. 
143Id. 
144Morison, 844 F.2d at 1061. 
145Id. at 1062. 
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explosions, which had previously occurred there, as well as information about a 
similar explosion that took place in East Germany.146  Subsequent to sending this 
material, Morison discovered on the desk of another analyst, a satellite photograph of 
a Soviet carrier under construction at the shipyard where the explosion took place.147  
Morison took these photographs from his co-worker’s desk, cut off the borders 
indicating that the photos were both classified and were taken according to a secret 
method, and mailed them to Wood.148  The photographs were subsequently published 
in Jane’s and eventually, The Washington Post.149  Morison received $300 for his 
services.150  Once published, the Navy conducted an investigation, which eventually 
pointed to Morison.  When initially confronted with the evidence against him, 
Morison denied having taken the photographs.151 
Morison was eventually convicted on two counts under sections 793 (d) and (e).  
Section (d) was applied as to the photographs, as he arguably had authorized 
possession.  Section (e) was applied as to the secret reports, because he had retained 
them without authorization.  Morison challenged these convictions on the grounds 
that sections 793 (d) and (e) did not apply to his actions because they, like the other 
provisions of the Espionage Act, if properly read, applied only to cases involving 
classic espionage.152  He argued that, by virtue of the fact that he disclosed 
information to the press and not a foreign agent or government, his actions did not 
fall under the ambit of the statutes.153 
The court refused to accept these arguments, relying instead on the “plain 
language” of each section, particularly the language “to a person not entitled to 
receive it” to uphold Morison’s conviction under 793 (d) and (e).154  The court 
additionally stated that because the statutes should be construed in pari materia with 
the other provisions of the act,155 and because the language under section 794 covers 
communication to a foreign agent or government, that section 793 cannot apply 
strictly to classic espionage, but rather to the distinct offenses of communication to 
unauthorized persons and unauthorized retention.156  The court believed that section 
                                                                
146Id. at 1061. 
147Id. 
148Id. 
149Morison, 844 F.2d at 1062. 
150Id. at 1061.  
151Id. at 1062. 
152Id. at 1063. 
153Id. 
154See Morison, 844 F.2d at 1063 (finding that “The language of the two statutes includes 
no limitation to spies or to ‘an agent’ of a foreign government’ either as to the transmitter or 
the transmittee of the information and they declare no exemption in favor of one who leaks to 
the press.  It covers ‘anyone’.  It is difficult to conceive any language more definite and 
clear.”) 
155Id. at 1064. 
156Id. at 1065. 
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793, while broad and general in its scope could be used to prosecute government 
employees who leak information to the press, if the proper limiting instructions are 
used.157 
Morison made an additional argument that subsections 793(d) and (e) did not 
apply to him. He argued that there had been only one previous attempt to prosecute 
anyone who had disclosed to a party other than an agent of a foreign government 
(Ellsberg and Russo), and that case was dismissed, whereas the sections had 
previously only been applied successfully against individuals who disclosed 
information to agents of foreign governments.158  Therefore, he argued, the failure to 
prosecute anyone else for disclosing information to a person other than an agent of a 
foreign government meant that the statute did not apply to non-espionage 
disclosures.159  The court rejected this argument, holding that the lack of prosecution 
was not because of any lack of applicability of the statute, but rather a reflection of 
both the difficulty of proving violations under these sections, as well as the 
government’s problem of “balancing the need for prosecution against the possible 
damage that a public trial will require by disclosure of vital national interest 
secrets.”160  The court also rejected Morison’s First Amendment arguments under the 
statute by stating that the First Amendment is not meant to “confer a license on either 
the reporter or his news source to violate valid criminal laws.”161 
In addition to upholding the conviction of Morison under sections 793(d) and (e), 
the court also upheld his conviction under section 641, for converting the satellite 
photographs, which the court ruled were government property, that the defendant 
converted for his own use.162 
If a literal reading of the statutory language is accepted, Morison’s conviction 
under the statute is proper, at least in regard to sections 793 (d) and (e), because 
Morison arguably had “reason to believe that the information could be used to the 
injury of the United States or the advantage of a foreign nation,”163 because the items 
he transmitted, clearly indicated that they involved the use of intelligence sources 
and methods.  In addition, though this is not relevant to the terms of the statute itself, 
Morison’s motivations for committing his acts also seem more within the realm of 
traditional espionage behavior than someone leaking information to expose 
government wrongdoing.  Despite Morison’s subsequent claims that his purpose was 
“to alert the public that the Soviet Union was preparing to vastly expand its naval 
reach, and that he took no payment for the photographs,”164 the trial court found 
evidence to the contrary.  As Judge Russell stated, “the record affords substantial 
                                                                
157Id. at 1070-73. 
158Morison, 844 F.2d at 1066. 
159Id. 
160Id. at 1067. 
161Id. at 1069 (quoting Justice White in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972))..  
162Id. at 1077. 
16318 U.S.C.A. §§ 793(d)-(e) (West 2001). 
164Vernon Loeb, Clinton Ignored CIA in Pardoning Intelligence Analyst; Clemency for 
Only Official Convicted of Leaking Classified Information to Media Draws Criticism, 
WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 17, 2001 at A06. 
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evidence... that the defendant in this case was not fired by zeal for public debate ... 
he was motivated not by patriotism and the public interest, but by self-interest.”165  
This was a result of Morison volunteering the information to Wood as part of an 
effort to help him secure a job with Jane’s, as opposed to motivation to uncover 
government misconduct or alert the public to a danger that could not be 
communicated by other means.  In the sense that the evidence pointed in this 
direction, Morison’s behavior is not much different from the “classic spy,” who in 
many instances is motivated, if not by hatred for the United States and its policies, 
than at least by personal gain.  Finally, though Judge Wilkinson’s concurrence states 
that the First Amendment implications of Morison’s prosecution under the statute 
should not be so quickly dismissed, because “the undeniable effect of the disclosure 
was to enhance public knowledge and interest in the projection of Soviet sea 
power,”166 disclosure to a British publication of limited circulation would not likely 
serve to foster debate among United States citizens, except in the most limited 
circles. 
The court’s upholding of the conviction under section 641 by contrast is more 
problematic.  By defining the photograph as a “thing of value” the Morison court 
stretches the terms literal meaning, as the statute itself specifically defines the term 
“value” as “face, par, or market value, or cost price, either wholesale or retail, 
whichever is greater.”167  Because the government cannot readily place a market 
value on a satellite photograph, or perhaps because Morison received $300 after the 
fact or because he received compensation for his contributions to Jane’s as a matter 
of pattern or practice, it appears that the court’s application of the term “thing of 
value” is, at best, a strained interpretation of the statutory language.  Other courts, 
however, are sharply divided on the actual scope of the phrase, with some courts 
refusing to discuss section 641 on its merits when the defendant is convicted on other 
charges.168  Furthermore, the applicability of both section 793 and section 641 
against leaks of classified national security information to the press was thrown into 
serious doubt, when on his last day in office, President Clinton pardoned Morison 
creating a firestorm of criticism within the intelligence community.169 
As will be discussed, though the statute is flawed, prosecution under section 793 
represents a far better alternative to the blanket prohibitions of the Classified 
                                                                
165Morison, 844 F.2d at 1077. 
166Id. at 1081. 
16718 U.S.C.A. § 641 (West 2001).  
168See generally United States v. Truong Dinh Hung 629 F.2d 908 at 927 (4th Cir. 1980) 
(stating that “because § 641 would disturb the structure of the criminal prohibitions Congress 
has erected to prevent some, and only some, disclosures of classified information, the general 
anti-theft statute should not be stretched to penalize the unauthorized disclosure of classified 
information.”)  See also Boyce v. United States, 594 F.2d 1246 (9th Cir. 1979).  The propriety 
of conviction under § 641 not reached since he was convicted under §§ 793, 794, and 798 and 
sentences ran concurrently.  Id.  But see, United States v. Lambert 446 F. Supp. 890 (D. Conn. 
1978) (finding that information derived form a DEA computer was both a thing of value and a 
record under § 641 and therefore the statute could be applied to convict, with proper limiting 
instructions.) 
169See Loeb, Clinton Ignored CIA in Pardoning Intelligence Analyst, supra note 164, at 
AO6. 
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Information Protection Act for prosecution of government employees who leak 
classified information to the press.  Ideally, an amendment to section 793, if 
narrowly tailored to specific acts of disclosure, would be a far better alternative, 
because it does not abandon the scienter requirement. 
VI.  NON-STATUTORY TOOLS TO PREVENT DISCLOSURE:  PREPUBLICATION  
REVIEWS AND ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS 
The government has other means to protect against leaks of classified national 
defense information by government employees.  Congress has given authority to the 
heads of agencies, under several statutes to promulgate measures to protect classified 
national security information and explicitly created certain sanctions to protect 
them.170  The primary statute and the greatest source of adjudication is section 403 of 
Title 50 (The National Security Act), which describes the authority of the Director of 
the CIA.171 
More frequently used controls over an employee’s disclosure of classified 
information, particularly within the context of the CIA, are pre-publication review 
agreements.  These agreements provide, as a pre-condition of employment, that 
prospective employees agree not to disclose any classified information that they may 
learn through the course of their employment.  Generally, the agreements have been 
adjudicated in the context of former agency employees.172   
The first major challenge on First Amendment grounds to these non-disclosure 
agreements occurred in the Fourth Circuit case, Marchetti v. United States.173  In 
Marchetti, the plaintiff, a fourteen year employee of the CIA, signed an agreement 
when he joined the agency agreeing not to divulge classified information without the 
express authorization of the Director or his authorized representative, and Marchetti 
also signed a secrecy oath when he resigned.174  After his resignation, Marchetti 
wrote a novel about an agency very similar to the CIA.175  He also wrote articles for 
                                                                
170See generally 50 U.S.C.A. § 435 (West 2001) (Congress not only grants the President 
the ability to establish procedures protecting classified information by means of executive 
order, but also grants the heads of agencies with control over classified information to deny or 
terminate security clearances in the interests of national security.  Id.); 5 U.S.C.A. § 7532 
(West 2001) (authorizing the Secretary of Defense authority to terminate or suspend 
employment of any National Security Agency officer or employee “in the interests of the 
United States” or “in the interests of national security”). 
171The National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C.A. § 403 (West 2001) (giving the director 
of the CIA the authority to prescribe appropriate security measures for agency employees and 
contractors, take measures to protect intelligence sources and methods, and terminate the 
employment of any officer and employee in the interests of national security). 
172See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980); Marchetti v. United States, 486 
F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972). 
173486 F.2d 1309. 
174Id. at 1312.  The relevant part of the secrecy agreement read as follows: “I do solemly 
swear that I will never divulge, publish or reveal either by word, conduct, or by any other 
means, any classified information…except in the performance of my duties…unless 
specifically authorized in writing, in each case, by the Director of Central Intelligence, or his 
authorized representatives.”  Id. 
175Id. at 1313. 
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magazines and conducted interviews relating to his experiences as an agent, which 
the government claimed contained classified information,176 and also submitted a 
proposal to a publishing house for a non-fiction account of his experiences as an 
agent.177  The government subsequently sought a temporary restraining order against 
Marchetti for publishing classified information in violation of his secrecy agreement 
and secrecy oath, until such time as the agency could review the content of his 
proposed book to determine that he did not divulge classified information.178  
Marchetti then challenged the order as a violation of his First Amendment rights to 
criticize the government.179  Unlike in the Pentagon Papers, the court relied on 
contract theory to uphold the prior restraint imposed by the secrecy agreement 
Marchetti signed as a condition of employment, but refused to uphold the secrecy 
oath, on the basis that there was no consideration for that agreement.180   The court 
concluded that the secrecy agreement was a valid exercise of the CIA’s authority to 
protect intelligence sources and methods as authorized by the National Security 
Act.181  The court, in declining enforcement of the secrecy oath, stated that Marchetti 
should be allowed the ability, like other citizens to criticize the government to the 
extent that his criticisms do not disclose classified information that is not already in 
the public domain.182  Furthermore, while the court stated that Marchetti’s right to 
publish should not be unduly delayed, and that he should be able to challenge any 
action of the CIA disapproving publication in court, it effectively foreclosed this 
remedy by declaring its belief that, in general, courts were incompetent to adjudicate 
the propriety of classification in matters of foreign intelligence.183 
The courts have subsequently determined that, while de novo review is 
authorized by the Freedom of Information Act, the agency’s determination should be 
upheld for information that is “properly classified or classifiable,”184 and that the 
classification scheme established by executive order should be reviewed by 
balancing the government’s substantial interest in assuring the secrecy of intelligence 
operations against the former agent’s First Amendment interest in public disclosure, 
                                                                
176Id. 
177Marchetti, 466 F.2d at 1313. 
178Id. at 1311. 
179Id. at 1312. 
180Id. at 1311. 
181Id. at 1316. 
182Marchetti, 466 F.2d. at 1317. 
183Id. at 1317 – 18. 
184Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1975).  Colby was a companion 
case to Marchetti, in which the publisher sought to challenge the propriety of the CIA 
classification scheme and made clear that the presumption was heavily in favor of the 
classifying agency.  The court recognized that information in a classified document, regardless 
of the level of sensitivity, takes on the character of the most sensitive information contained in 
the document, and it is irrelevant whether such information was classified at the time of the 
agent’s service or at some time thereafter, as long as he had knowledge of the information at 
the time he served.  Id. 
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thus requiring that the agency only show a logical relationship between the censored 
information and the reasons for classification.185  
The problem with such prepublication review schemes is that no statute 
authorizes them.  Section 403-3 of Title 50 merely states that the Director shall 
“protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.”186  In light 
of First Amendment concerns, this grant of authority, because of its non-specific 
terms, is especially broad.  This, coupled with the fact that courts are reluctant to 
second-guess the Executive Branch, allows them free rein to apply this scheme 
against any views it may deem contrary to its mission.  As Professors Edgar and 
Schmidt noted: 
We do not view this system of prior restraints as necessarily unsound as a 
matter of policy, although we have doubts.  Nor do we believe that the 
courts should invalidate such a program on First Amendment grounds if 
Congress authorized it in reasonably clear terms …  Private employment 
contracts frequently impose secrecy obligations which courts routinely 
enforce…on the other hand, one can be sure that a prepublication 
clearance system with the CIA will be a disaster to core First Amendment 
values…the problems endemic to wholesale administrative censorship 
will flourish in this context; and doubts will be resolved in favor of 
suppression … bureaucratic self-interest will result in selective 
enforcement … and decisions will be made behind a veil of secrecy … the 
process will be expensive, debilitating and chilling.187 
Many of these fears came to fruition in Snepp v. United States.188  Frank Snepp 
was a former CIA agent who, like Marchetti, signed a secrecy agreement upon hire 
and signed another secrecy agreement upon his employment termination.189  Snepp 
subsequently published a book, Decent Interval, based upon his experiences as an 
agent and criticized CIA activities in South Vietnam.190  Unlike Marchetti, however, 
who submitted his manuscripts to the CIA for review prior to publication, Snepp did 
not.191  The government stipulated that Snepp did not violate his agreement by virtue 
of publication of classified material, but rather because he breached a trust by virtue 
of the agreement, by not submitting any manuscripts to the pre-publication review to 
which he agreed.192  At the time, Snepp received $60,000 in advance payments from 
his publisher.193 The Supreme Court, in a startling per curiam opinion, held that 
                                                                
185McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
18650 U.S.C.A. § 403-3(c)(7) (West 2001). 
187See Curtiss-Wright Comes Home, supra note 14, at 367-68. 
188Snepp, 444 U.S. at 507. 
189Id. at 508. 
190Anthony R. Klein, Comment, National Security Information:  It’s Proper Role and 
Scope in a Representative Democracy, 42 FED. COMM. L.J. 433 at 443 (1990). 
191See Curtiss-Wright Comes Home, supra note 14, at 371. 
192Snepp, 444 U.S. at 510. 
193Id. at 508. 
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Snepp, though he had not published any classified information, had deliberately 
violated his position of trust with the CIA by failing to submit his manuscript for 
prepublication review.194  Relying on the trial testimony of Stansfield Turner, then 
director of the CIA, the Court agreed with the lower court’s finding that by failing to 
give the agency the opportunity to determine whether the book’s disclosure of 
unclassified information would compromise any classified information within the 
agency, Snepp compromised the effectiveness of the agency’s operations,195 though 
it was later admitted that Snepp was singled out for prosecution, as opposed to 
others, because his publication criticized the CIA.196  The Court approved a 
constructive trust against Snepp, whereby Snepp was required to disgorge any profits 
he received from the publication of the book to the CIA.197 
Justice Stevens, in response to this extraordinary remedy, strongly dissented, 
claiming that the Court had fashioned a remedy inconsistent with existing contract, 
statutory, or common law,198 which enabled the Court to impose penalties for alleged 
injuries that were not contemplated in the agreement.199  Justice Stevens was 
additionally troubled by the Court dismissal of Snepp’s First Amendment rights by 
asserting a remedy that was not consonant with existing jurisprudence concerning 
prior restraints.200  By doing so, the Court essentially gutted the ruling of the 
Pentagon Papers in relation to the speech rights of government employees who 
merely have access to classified information.  From this precedent, any agency that 
classifies information, can impose similar restraints on their employees through 
invocation of secrecy agreements. 
In addition, each agency dealing with classified information has its own 
regulations authorized by statute for dealing with employees who disclose classified 
information, with penalties ranging from revocations of security clearances to 
suspension or dismissal from employment.201  Unlike the pre-publication review 
scheme used by the CIA, these regulations do not implicate the Court’s presumption, 
strong or not, against prior restraints, though they are arguably consistent with the 
rule set forth in Pickering and Connick, because the statutes authorizing them contain 
due process for the employee sanctioned.202  As such, these regulations are the most 
common form of discipline used against employees who “leak” information. 
                                                                
194Id. at 511. 
195Id. at 511-12. 
196Klein, supra note 190, at 444. 
197Snepp, 444 U.S. at 514. 
198Id. at 517. 
199Id. at 522. 
200Id. at 526. 
201See, e.g., Du Val supra note 6, at 672-3.  Du Val maintains that informal and 
administrative sanctions are the principal methods of controlling dissemination of classified 
information.  Id.; Charlson, supra note 11, at 1014-15. (existing sanctions include revocation 
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VII.  THE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PROTECTION ACT – FIXING LEAKS  
WITH A HAMMER? 
Amid this morass of statutes, agency regulations and secrecy agreements, and 
judicial interpretations over key statutory terms since the original Espionage Statutes 
were enacted in 1917, comes the proposal for a new anti-leak statute, the Classified 
Information Protection Act of 2001.  The best way to examine the likely effects of 
this statute, both intended and unintended, is to examine the plain language of the 
bill, because the legislative history is minimal.  There are two reasons for this 
approach. First, because the bill is an amendment to the Espionage Statutes, and the 
courts have, for the most part, regardless of the legislative history, looked to the plain 
meaning of the text for guidance.  Second, the legislative history for the proposed 
bill is virtually non-existent.  In the absence of any debates on record for the current 
version of the bill, the small amount of legislative record for the vetoed Senate bill 
from 2000203 will have to suffice, but it lends little to the discussion.204 
A.  Who Does the Statute Cover? 
The initial question to be answered is, who is the statute supposed to cover?  The 
relevant text of the statute reads, “Whoever, being an officer or employee of the 
United States, a former or retired officer or employee of the United States, any other 
person with authorized access to classified information or any other person formerly 
with access to classified information.”205  According to the definitions section, 
officer or employee are defined in 5 U.S.C. §§ 2104 and 2105.  Section 2104 defines 
“officer” as a “justice or judge of the United States and an individual who is required 
by law to be appointed in the civil service”206 by the President, a court, an agency 
head, or the secretary of a Military department, if they are performing a federal 
function.207  “Employee” is likewise defined as an individual engaged in a federal 
function who is appointed by any of the following; the President, Congress, a 
member of the uniformed service, any other employee as defined by the section, the 
head of a Government-controlled corporation, or an adjutant general.208  This is an 
extremely broad classification and could include anyone from the current or former 
Secretaries of Defense, all the way down to the lowest level bureaucrat. 
The prohibition further applies against “any other person with authorized access, 
or any other person formerly with authorized access” to classified information.209  
The statute defines “authorized” as those: 
Having authority or permission to have access to the classified 
information pursuant to the provisions of a statute, Executive order, 
regulation or directive of the head of any department or agency who is 
                                                                
203S. 2507, 106th Congress (2001). 
204See 146 Cong. Rec. S 9684 (daily ed. October 3, 2000) (statement of Sen. Biden). 
205See H.R. 2943, 107th Cong. (2001). 
2065 U.S.C.A. § 2104 (West 2001). 
207Id. 
2085 U.S.C.A. § 2105 (West 2001). 
209See H.R. 2943, 107th Cong. (2001). 
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empowered to classify information, an order of any United States court, or 
a provision of any Resolution of the Senate or Rule of the House of 
Representatives which governs release of classified information by such 
House of Congress.210 
This is also impermissibly vague.  According to this definition, the statute would 
theoretically cover independent contractors and scientific researchers working on 
defense or intelligence related technology, but not technically officers or employees.  
The statute is probably meant to cover these individuals.  The statute, as written 
however, if taken to admittedly unusual extremes, could theoretically also apply to 
members of Congress and certainly members of their legislative staff, because in 
many cases, their authority or permission to have access to such information is based 
upon statutes, Executive orders, regulations or directives. 
Because it is clear that Congress did not intend to make itself criminally liable 
under the bill, the “cure” for leaks that the statute allegedly provides may well be 
incomplete, as evidenced by a recent episode.  In two separate incidents since the 
September 11 attacks, members of Congress themselves ran afoul of the President 
for disclosing allegedly “classified information” to the press.  In the first instance, 
the administration criticized Senator Orrin Hatch, who, after attending a classified 
briefing, disclosed to the media that he had seen concrete evidence linking the 
attacks to Osama bin Laden.211  The other instance arose from a statement made by 
Senator Shelby, the original sponsor of the leak legislation, that Americans could 
expect further terrorist attacks following military action in Afghanistan.212  While 
most now agree that the information disclosed in the second incident was not 
technically classified, the Bush administration used these incidents as basis of a 
threat to restrict access to military and intelligence data, to eight ranking members of 
Congress,213 before eventually relenting. 
These episodes illustrate three points.  First, if these disclosures were, in fact, 
disclosures of classified information, whether damaging to national security or not, it 
would have made it a crime for “officers” and “employees” but not for members of 
Congress, whose act of leaking information is more likely to be politically motivated 
than that of an executive branch bureaucrat.  Second, it illustrates how relatively 
benign disclosures can potentially take on the character of a crime under the statute, 
especially where information is obviously in the public’s interest to know, thus 
bringing into question concerns of overbreadth.  Third, despite the fact that courts 
give great deference to the judgment of the Executive Branch in matters of national 
security, it calls into serious question whether the Executive’s reasoning for 
classifying this type of information is legitimate under the circumstances, because 
the public’s interest in knowing the details of this information is more compelling 
than the government’s interest in keeping it secret. 
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B.  What Does the Statute Cover? 
The second question is, what does the statute cover?  This provides potentially 
greater problems.  The statute prohibits willful disclosure or attempts to disclose, 
“any classified information to a person other than an officer or employee of the 
United States, knowing that the person does not have authorized access to such 
classified information.”214  The only intent requirement in the statute is willful 
communication to an unauthorized person.  Therefore, disclosures to the press or the 
public would be punishable under the statute, thus implicating First Amendment 
rights.  Unlike section 793 (d) of the Espionage Act, there is no requirement that the 
person have knowledge or even reason to believe that the information could be used 
to the injury of the United States.  Thus, any disclosure is punishable, regardless of 
the degree of harm, and the government does not have to prove any harmful purpose.  
This would open the door to selective prosecution because the government could, at 
its election, quietly punish by sanction those disclosures that do not bring the policies 
of the Executive branch into question, while allowing for prosecution of people like 
Ellsberg, whose disclosure, in retrospect caused no identifiable damage to national 
security, but merely called into question the actions of the Executive branch and 
certainly was relevant for the purposes of informed debate of government policy.  As 
one commentator noted, “Congress should be guided by the principle that liability 
should extend only to the conduct that is likely to harm national security…when 
someone is subject to a criminal sanction, there should be no reasonable doubt as to 
the harmful consequences of his act.215 
C.  What Constitutes Classified Information? 
Finally, there is the issue of “classified information.”  It is widely accepted that 
the classification system, as it is currently constituted, has a tendency to overclassify 
information.216  The former head of the Information Security Oversight Office noted 
that there were over 8 million secrets classified in 1999 alone.217  Furthermore, there 
was, until recently, no principled means of declassifying information.218  As a result, 
the declassification of information, that would be subject to the statute lags far 
behind the ability to declassify it. 
One absurd example of the failure to declassify is that the total intelligence 
budget for 1947 remained classified as of 2000.219  Thus under the statute, as literally 
construed, a former employee of the CIA who had access to this information when 
classified and later disclosed it could be subject to prosecution.  While it is fairly safe 
to say that courts and prosecutors would not punish the individual under such 
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circumstances, there may be situations where other types of information of more 
recent vintage remain classified, which the former employee would not appreciate.  
Publication would subject a former employee to pre-publication review as under 
Snepp.  However, if a former employee gave an interview to a magazine like 
Marchetti, could the employee be subject to criminal penalty under the new statue?  
Under the proposed bill, he most likely would. 
The other side of the equation is the classification system itself.  Because the 
responsibility for classification of information has largely been delegated to the 
President, he is generally free to make his own determinations as to the amount and 
level of classification required.  Since the beginning of the use of Executive orders 
governing classification of national security information, each succeeding 
administration has a different idea of the parameters of what should be classified.220  
Given this fact, if H.R. 2943 is enacted, there would be “an egregious effect on First 
Amendment freedoms ... not only would such measures allow the secrecy-oriented 
executive branch to subordinate ... the public’s need for open debate, but under the 
current approach to classification, invariable First Amendment interests would 
become subject to the vicissitudes of consecutive administrations.”221  
Another complicating factor is the broad discretion within agencies in 
determining when or whether to classify information.  As one report stated, as of 
1997, an estimated three million government and industry employees today have the 
potential ability to mark information as classified.222  This raises some interesting 
dilemmas.  As former Secretary of Defense Cohen noted in a recent article, 
[I]nformation can be classified in one context and not be (or appear not to 
be) in another … it is not uncommon for different agencies to assign 
different classification levels to essentially the same information, and in 
some cases, information that one agency might determine to be 
unclassified might be considered classified by another agency.223 
This, combined with the courts’ reluctance to second-guess the propriety of 
classification at the agency level,224 creates practical difficulties in enforcement.  The 
question becomes, does the government pursue prosecution on the basis of which 
department the employee works in?  If the purpose of the statute is to protect 
classified information, the statute ultimately fails, because it cannot be applied 
against an individual for whom the information is not classified and then punish 
unfairly the individual for whom the information is classified.  In summary, because 
the Executive branch both creates the guidelines for classification and is responsible 
for punishment, enactment of H.R. 2943 gives reason to “doubt the wisdom of the 
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fox to define the parameters of – not to mention guard – the chicken coop.”225  As 
currently formulated, the statute operating in the context of the classification system 
as it exists, would exert a chill on legitimate speech and would be akin to using a 
hammer to fix a leak – an inappropriate and ineffective tool, given the circumstances. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Clearly, under the existing framework of the executive classification system, the 
Classified Information Protection Act sweeps too broadly and would chill discourse 
by adversely affecting the citizen’s legitimate right to speak on matters of public 
interest, and would interfere with the ability of the press to inform the populace.  
Therefore, the bill should be rejected.  This is not to say that the government does 
not have a legitimate need to protect national security interests.  There are, however, 
already many more narrowly tailored statutes on the books, which protect the most 
critical kinds of information from disclosure.  Atomic secrets are protected.  
Cryptological information is protected.  The identities of agents are protected.  
National Defense information, broadly defined in Gorin, is protected.  The espionage 
statutes have been used against government employees who leaked sensitive 
information to the press.  Administrative sanctions are in place, but it is unclear the 
extent to which they are used, because those matters are secret.  As John Martin, 
formerly the top official for the Justice Department responsible for supervision of the 
investigation of leaks and espionage stated, “the real problem with leaks has not been 
a lack of statutory sanctions but the lack of will on the part of agency heads and 
Cabinet secretaries to enforce security regulations.”226  
According to an Intelligence Committee position paper supporting the original 
version of the Classified Information protection Act, current law does not cover 
“leaked intelligence information regarding sources and methods, counter-narcotics, 
counterintelligence capabilities and liaison relationships with foreign intelligence 
groups, because they don’t fall within the definition of the term ‘national defense 
information.’”227  If that is true, then why not propose specific statutes, like the 
Intelligence Identities Protection Act, which narrowly target specific identifiable 
threats to national security, rather than a blanket prohibition on speech?  Entirely 
new statues can be written or Congress can amend terms, such as “national security 
information,” within the statutes.  Not only would this eliminate guesswork on the 
part of the courts but it would, preserve the important requirement that the person 
have knowledge or reason to believe that the information can be used to the injury of 
the United States.228 
The only other alternative to save such a broad statute would be for Congress to 
take the lead in setting forth a consistent and principled framework governing 
Executive classification decisions.229  The argument has been made that, of all our 
institutions, Congress is best equipped to balance the needs for secrecy and the need 
                                                                
225See Curtiss-Wright Comes Home, supra note 14, at 354. 
226Pincus & Loeb, supra note 40. 
227Id. 
22818 U.S.C.A. § 793(d) (West 2001).  This formulation would be consistent with the 
section 793(d) scienter requirement. 
229See Moynihan Report, supra note 50, at xxii-xxiii (discussing one such framework.) 
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for information to fuel public debate, as it is most sensitive and accountable to 
democratic principles.230  When considering matters of government secrecy, 
Congress and the Executive would be wise to follow the admonition of Justice 
Douglas when he said, “Secrecy in government is fundamentally anti-democratic, 
perpetuating bureaucratic errors.  Open debate and discussion of public issues are 
vital to our national health.”231   
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